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[See CAU 10/04/89, 10/06/89 for summary of events surrounding Oct. 3 attempted coup, and
subsequent developments.] Oct. 4: In San Diego, Costa Rican President Oscar Arias said the failed
coup "won't be the last" such effort to depose Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega. Arias said that he
preferred diplomatic pressure rather than military action to oust Noriega and restore democracy to
Panama. The president's comments were made at the Institute of the Americas. He later received
the institute's "Award for Democracy and Peace." On Wednesday evening, the Panamanian
government announced that three colonels had been arrested: Guillermo Wong, chief of the G2
secret police; Julio Ow Young; and, Armando Palacios. The announcement also said attempted coup
leader Maj. Moises Giroldi and nine other rebels had been killed. Oct. 5: White House Chief of Staff
John Sununu ordered a study of how the Panama coup was handled. Salvos of criticism between
some congresspersons and the administration continued. Unidentified administration officials
told the New York Times that it was now accepted that Noriega was held prisoner by the rebels for
between two and four hours. In Panama, Noriega said he persuaded his captors to release him when
it was apparent that the coup was failing. Administration officials cited by the Times said US Army
troops in Panama had moved at the request of the rebels to block two routes that the rebels believed
would be used by forces loyal to the general. In earlier reports of the roadblocks, US officials had
said the intention was to protect US lives and property. The officials said the roadblock failed
because a third road eventually used by Noriega's loyal troops was not blocked. In an interview
with the Times, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney said the White House had "made a conscious
decision" not to confront the Noriega forces actively because officials in Washington did not see any
circumstances under which they could have seized the general without going to war with a faction
of the Panamanian Defense Forces. An unidentified administration official told the Times that the
rebels had told military officers in the Army's Southern Command that they "won't" turn Noreiga
over to the US. This was accurately relayed to Pentagon officials in Washington. Meanwhile, the US
Southern Command informed the US embassy in Panama of the same, which was misunderstood
as the rebels suggesting that they "want" to turn Noriega over. The misinterpreted message from
the rebels was reportedly received by the State Department and CIA simultaneously, prompting
the State Department to call a hurried meeting with government lawyers to consider such a step.
Minutes later the coup collapsed. A few hours later, CIA representatives were in Congress briefing
members of the Congressional Intelligence committees with the agency's version of events, which
was that the rebels were prepared to hand over Noriega. The Times also cited unidentified officials
as saying that the coup leaders' plan was to declare a coup and then wait to see how many units
rallied to each side. The rebels' plan did not include Noriega's capture, said an official cited by the
Times. Nonetheless, said the official, the rebels "fortuitiously" seized him in the Defense Forces
headquarters and held him for several hours. Spokesperson for Noriega, Maj. Edgardo Lopez,
said that the general had been tipped off by an alarm bell set off by a supporter as he parked his
car in his military headquarters grounds on Tuesday morning. Lopez said Lt. Jorge Bonilla of the
Urraca battalion had tried to kill Noriega but failed. He said Bonilla was killed in the ensuing battle.
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Lopez told a US reporter: "There was a lot of money involved in this coup. We found a briefcase
full of cash that belonged to one of the rebels...My General (Noriega) was not armed, nor was he
wearing a bulletproof vest." Oct. 6: In a letter published in government newspaper Critica, unnamed
"nationalist" businesspersons offered $250,000 to assassins who kill six "traitors," including former
president Eric Arturo Delvalle and Col. Roberto Diaz Herrera, a former top commander who was
among the first to accuse Noriega of drug trafficking. The letter was addressed to daily columnist
Balatazar Renan Aizprua. The money, said the letter, had been deposited in a Swiss account.
According to the offer: "They (opponents) have allowed a price to be put on (Noriega's) head, with
dollars given to them by the United States...[Therefore,] we consider it justified to use our money to
pay those who execute traitors." The Revolutionary Democratic Party declared support for proposed
emergency or "war" laws aimed at public employees who do not support the government. Party
official Rigoberto Parades said, "All of those we can detect we are going to fire." Noriega and his
supporters were incensed at reports that some public employees began celebrating Tuesday when
rebels temporarily took over the Defense Forces headquarters. The emergency legislation package is
also to include more rigorous sanctions for "foreign agents," or persons working in Panama serving
foreign governments or organizations and not accredited with those governments' embassies.
In a statement, the Civil Democratic Opposition Alliance (ADOC) said that the government had
launched a new phase of persecution. As a result, ADOC had decided to delay the return to Panama
of vice presidential candidate in the annulled May elections, Guillermo Ford. Next, Ricardo Arias
Calderon, also a vice presidential candidate in May, was reportedly in hiding. In a report published
Oct. 6, Copley News Service cited US sources in Panama who said that US officials encouraged and
gave indirect support to Maj. Giroldi, but abandoned him during the coup attempt. The sources
requested anonymity. The sources said Giroldi had first informed US officials of his intentions in
mid-September, and confirmed his plans at a secret meeting with two CIA agents on the evening of
Oct. 1. The agents were told that Giroldi's decision to go forward with the coup had been prompted
by what the major called the Noriega's irrational behavior during a cocktail party earlier that day.
"He told officers they should shoot down US planes, a dangerous statement since some are disposed
to take him literally," Giroldi told the CIA agents, according to the US sources. The sources said
that on the following day Panamanian troops fired small arms at a small US reconnaissance plane
but did not hit it. Next, the sources said senior US officials in Panama encouraged Giroldi to go
ahead and promised him indirect support in the form of blocking roads and a bridge to slow down
deployment of loyalist troops. Later, the US forces permitted the Noriega troops passage since
Washington had reportedly decided not to directly influence the outcome. This decision reportedly
doomed Giroldi, who was surrounded, forced to surrender and later executed by loyalists, said
the sources, who insisted they not be identified. Giroldi's wife was used as his first secret liaison
with the CIA. Prior to the coup attempt, she took refuge in a US military base before the coup.
US sources said other rebel officers had not taken the same precaution and Noriega may have
ordered some of their family members captured and held hostage to negotiate his release. Some
Panamanian political analysts said they believed the US had deliberately lifted its road and bridge
blockade during the coup attempt, to allow pro-Noriega forces passage in the hope of creating a
face-off between pro- and anti-Noriega forces. According to Jose Stoute of the Center for Latin
American Studies, a Panamanian think tank, "A situation of split power would have legitimized US
intervention." (cont.)
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